This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud , the random arrival and the adjusted proportional rules.
Introduction
Game theory is the discipline that studies how agents make strategic decisions. It was initially developed in economics to understand a large collection of economic behaviors, including firms, markets and consumers. Specifically, a game is the mathematical formalization of such conflicts, originated by Antoine Augustine Cournot (1801-1877) in 1838 with his solution of the Cournot duopoly.
Modern game theory begins with the publication of the book "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" written by Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1953) , who considered cooperative games with several players. Indeed, according to Maschler (1992) after this initial point, game theory was developed extensively in the 1950s by numerous authors. Later on, the application field of game theory was not unique to Economics and we may find game theory in social network formation, behavioral economics, ethical behavior and biology, among others.
Game theory is divided into two branches, called the non-cooperative and cooperative branches. Actually, in the words of Aumann (1989, pp. 8-9) :
"Cooperative theory starts with a formalization of games that abstracts away altogether from procedures and [. . . ] concentrates, instead, on the possibilities for agreement [. . . ] There are several reasons that explain why cooperative games came to be treated separately. One is that when one does build negotiation and enforcement procedures explicitly into the model, then the results of a noncooperative analysis depend very strongly on the precise form of the procedures, on the order of making offers and counter-offers and so on. This may be appro-priate in voting situations in which precise rules of parliamentary order prevail, where a good strategist can indeed carry the day. But problems of negotiation are usually more amorphous; it is difficult to pin down just what the procedures are. More fundamentally, there is a feeling that procedures are not really all that relevant; that it is the possibilities for coalition forming, promising and threatening that are decisive, rather than whose turn it is to speak [. . . ] Detail distracts attention from essentials. Some things are seen better from a distance; the Roman camps around Metzada are indiscernible when one is in them, but easily visible from the top of the mountain."
These two branches of game theory differ in how they formalize interdependence among the players. In non-cooperative game theory, a game is a detailed model of all the moves available to the players. In contrast, cooperative game theory abstracts away from this level of detail, and describes only the outcomes that result when the players come together in different combinations. This research usually centers its interest on particular sets of strategies known as "solution concepts" or "equilibria" based on what is required by norms of (ideal) rationality. Among the several types of games, this paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility.
A coalitional game with transferable utility involving a set of agents (hereinafter a coalitional game) is a cooperative game that can be described as a function that associates with each group of agent (or coalition), a real number which the worth of the coalition. If a coalition forms, then it can divide its worth in any possible way among its members. This is possible if money is available as a medium of exchange, and if each player's utility for money is linear (see Aumann (1960) ). A solution on coalitional games is a correspondence that associates with each game a non-empty set of payoff vectors in R N whose coordinates add up to v(N ). One of the most important solutions is the core and it selects for each game all the payoff vectors such that no coalition could simultaneously provide a higher payoff to each of its members. The core is a multi-valued solution but the ones we present here, the Shapley value (Shapley 1953 ) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969) , are single-valued. We propose the computation of the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. As noted by Guajardo and Jörnsten (2015) it is usual to find mistakes in computing the nucleolus, but our results coincide with theirs.
The current approach is also focused on a particular case of coalitional games, the conflicting claims problems. This model describes the situation faced by a court that has to distribute the net worth of a bankrupt firm among its creditors. But, it also corresponds with cost-sharing, taxation, or rationing problems. Given a conflicting claims problem, a rule associates within each problem a distribution of the available resources among the agents. In this sense, we provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules.
Finally, the aim of this paper is to provide a toolbox which includes common solutions to cooperative games. Currently, there is no package available covering such algorithms. Lately, Kenkel and Signorino (2014) have developed the package Games, which focus on models of strategic interaction. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 has a methodology review for coalitional games and for the conflicting claims problem. In Section 3 we have the library structure and Section 4 provides some examples and illustrations.
2. Methodology Review 2.1. T U -cooperative games TU-cooperative games are used to model situations where cooperation benefits the agents (in terms of profits or costs). The different solutions given for the model propose distributions of the profits obtained after cooperation. Some examples of situations where this model applies are the construction of a motorway in which different agents are involved, the neighbors who must pay costs of an elevator, common cables, antennas, etc., cooperation between countries (European Union, UN, etc.) or between political parties to form governments (governments in coalitions).
The situations where conflicts of interest arise are called games and the agents involved in the game are called players, who may be individuals, nations, political parties, companies, firms, etc. In these models we assume that players can make binding agreements about the distribution of the payoffs or the choice of strategies. In addition, players are able to compensate each other by transferring utility, for example, through a perfectly divisible good, which is usually identified with money.
A TU-game involving a set of agents N ∈ N can be described as a function v, known as the characteristic function, which associates a real number to each subset of agents, or coalition, S contained in N . Formally, for each N ∈ N , a TU-game is a pair (N, v), where v : 2 N → R. For each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is commonly called its worth and denotes the quantity that agents in S can guarantee for themselves if they cooperate. Therefore, it is assumed that v(∅) = 0. It is also often supposed that (N, v) is superadditive, i.e., for any pair of coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S ∩ T = ∅, v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ), so that there is incentive for the grand coalition forms. Let G N denote the family of TU-games with agents set N.
A solution for TU-games is a correspondence which for each N ∈ N and each (N, v) ∈ G N , selects a set of allocations of the worth of the grand coalition among the agents. If a TUgame solution consists of a unique allocation, it is called a TU-value. Next we introduce the Shapely value (plus its natural extension as a power index) and the nucleolus.
The Shapley value (Shapley 1953 ). To present this solution, we need to define the marginal contribution of an agent. Given (N, v) ∈ G N , for each i ∈ N and each S ⊂ N , we call the marginal contribution of agent i to coalition S, denoted by ∆ i v(S), the amount which his adherence contributes to the value of the coalition, that is,
According to this solution the worth of the grand coalition is distributed assuming that all orders of agents' arrivals to the grand coalition are equally probable and in each order, each agent gets his marginal contribution from the coalition that he joins. Formally, for each (N, v) ∈ G N , the Shapley value, γ Sh , associates to each i ∈ N , the amount
The Shapley and Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) . This solution proposes the specialization of the Shapley value to voting games that measures the real power of a coalition. 1 The Shapley and Shubik index works as follows. There is a group of individuals all willing to vote on a proposal. They vote in order and as soon as a majority has voted for the proposal, it is declared passed and the member who voted last is given credit for having passed it. Let us consider that the members are voting randomly. Then we compute the frequency with which an individual is the one that gets the credit for passing the proposal. That measures the number of times that the action of that individual joining the coalition of their predecessors makes it a winning coalition. Note that if this index reaches the value of 0, then it means that this player is a dummy. When the index reaches the value of 1, the player is a dictator.
The nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969) . To introduce this solution, some additional notation is needed.
is the excess of coalition S with respect to x and represents a measure of dissatisfaction of such a coalition. The vector e(x) = {e(x, S)} S⊆N provides the excesses of all the coalitions in reference to x. Given x ∈ R n , θ(x) is the vector that results from x by permuting coordinates in decreasing order,
The nucleolus looks for an individually rational distribution of the worth of the grand coalition in which the maximum dissatisfaction is minimized. Formally, for each (N, v) ∈ G N , the nucleolus γ nu is the vector , v) . That is, the nucleolus selects the element in the core, if this is nonempty, that lexicographically minimizes the vector of non-increasing ordered excesses of coalitions. In order to compute this solution we consider the following linear programming model, which looks for an imputation that minimizes the maximum excess ε among all coalitions. Formally,
The per capita nucleolus represents a measure of dissatisfaction per capita of such a coalition. It is also an individually rational distribution of the worth of the grand coalition in which the maximum per capita dissatisfaction is minimized. Formally, is defined like the nucleolus but taking into the account the per capita excess, that isē(x, S) =
|S| of coalition S with respect to x.
The conflicting claims problem
A conflicting claims problem is a particular case of the distribution problem, in which the amount to be distributed, the endowment E, is not enough to satisfy the agents' claims on it. This model describes the situation faced by a court that has to distribute the net worth of a bankrupt firm among its creditors. But, it also corresponds with cost-sharing, taxation, or rationing problems. The formal analysis of situations like these, which originates in a seminal paper by O'Neill (1982) , shows that a vast number of well-behaved solutions have been defined for solving conflicting claims problems, being the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules the prominent concepts used. 2 An illustrative example of conflicting claims problems is the fishing quotas reduction, in which the agent's claim can be understood as the previous captures, and the endowment is the new (lower) level of joint captures (Gallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo (2003) ; Iñarra and Skonhof (2008) ). A similar example is given by milk quotas among European Union (EU) members. 3 In both examples, proportionality is the main principle used. Another example of conflicting claims situations is the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), where the income each victim would have earned in a full lifetime was estimated and the individual claim is the legal right to be compensated. Similarly, bankruptcy laws consider the claimants identity to establish a priority rule. Specifically, bankruptcy codes normally list all claims that should be treated identically in various categories and assigns to them lexicographic priorities (Kamiski 2006) . Sánchez-Soriano (2002, 2008) analyze, under the name of bankruptcy problems with references, the real-life case of allocating a given amount of money among the various degree courses that are offered at a (public) Spanish university. The (verifiable) monetary needs of each course constitute their claims. Additionally, there exist reference values for each course, which are set by the government independently, below their claims. Other relevant practical cases also involving more complex rationing situations could be protocols for the reduction of pollution (Giménez-Gómez, Teixidó-Figueras, and Vilella 2014) , water distribution in drought periods, or even some resource allocation procedures in the public health care sector, in which past consumption could be considered as an entitlement, and current needs as a claim (see, for instance, Hougaard, J., and Osterdal 2012 and MorenoTernero and Roemer 2012). The formalization of such problems is as follows.
Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} and amount E ∈ R + of an infinite divisible resource, the endowment, that has to be allocated among them. Each agent has a claim, c i ∈ R + on it. Let c ≡ (c i ) i∈N be the claims vector.
A conflicting claims problem is a pair (E, c) with
Without loss of generality, we will order the agents according to their claims c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ . . . ≤ c n and we will denote by B the set of all conflicting claims problems.
Given a conflicting claims problem, a rule associates within each problem a distribution of the endowment among the agents. A rule is a single-valued function ϕ : B → R n + such that 0 ≤ ϕ i (E, c) ≤ c i , for all i ∈ N (non-negativity and claim-boundedness); and
(efficiency). Those rules used throughout the present approach are introduced below.
The proportional (P) rule recommends a distribution of the endowment which is proportional to the claims: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N , P i (E, c) ≡ λc i , where λ = E i∈N c i .
The constrained equal awards (CEA) rule (Maimonides, 12 th century), proposes equal awards to all agents subject to no one receiving more than his claim: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N, CEA i (E, c) ≡ min {c i , µ} , where µ is such that i∈N min {c i , µ} = E.
The constrained equal losses (CEL) rule (Maimonides, 12th century (Aumann and Maschler 1985) , chooses the awards vector at which all agents incur equal losses, subject to no one receiving a negative amount: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N ,
where µ is such that
The Talmud (T) rule (Aumann and Maschler 1985) proposes to apply the constrained equal awards rule, if the endowment is not enough to satisfy the half-sum of the claims. Otherwise, each agent receives the half of his claim and the constrained equal losses rule is applied to distribute the remaining endowment: for each (E, c) ∈ B, and each i ∈ N,
The random arrival (RA) rule (O'Neill 1982) . Suppose that each claim is fully honoured until the endowment runs out following the order of the claimants' arrival. In order to remove the unfairness of the first-come first-served scheme associated with any particular order of arrival, the rule proposes to take the average of the awards vectors calculated in this way when all orders are equally probable: for each (E, c) ∈ B, and each i ∈ N, RA i (E, c) ≡
The adjusted proportional (AP) rule is a composition of minimal rights and the proportional rule. Firstly, we attribute to each claimant his minimal right and revise his claim down. Then, the proportional rule is applied to distribute the remaining endowment according to the revised claims: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N , AP i (E, c) = m i (E, c) + P (E − i∈N m i (E, c), c − m(E, c)).
Library structure
The GameTheory package is designed to implement common solutions to cooperative games. In particular, we focus on transferable utility games, conflicting claims problems and voting power index. GameTheory is available from the Comprehensive R Archive Network at http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=GameTheory. In order to install and load the library, execute the following commands: > install.packages("GameTheory") > library(GameTheory)
Game class
Command Output Max players GameTheory package depends on lpSolveAPI to perform linear programming optimization, kappalab, combinat, and ineq. The results presented in this paper have been obtained using R version 3.1.2 on a Mac running OS X 10.10.2. The main commands (a brief summary of all available instructions is displayed in Table 1 ) of the library are :
Nucleolus(game,type): Obtains the nucleolus of TU-game with a maximum of 4 players. The needed arguments are an object of class Game and the kind of game. This command works either with a gains or cost game, simply specify the type of the game. To calculate an alternate nucleolus imputations execute NucleolusCapita().
ShapleyValue(game,names): Performs the calculation of the Shapley value for an N-player TU-game. The extension to voting power index is made by ShapleyShubik().
AllRules(E,claims,names): Obtains the allocations for a N-agents following the all the conflicting claims rules presented in Section 2.2. This command performs Proportional(), CEA(), CEL(), Talmud() and RandomArrival() simultaneously and includes the Gini Index to check inequality among them. Results can be displayed with plot() and LorenzRules().
Examples and Illustrations

T U -cooperative games
In order to illustrate T U -cooperative games we first take the example proposed by Lemaire (1991) where three individuals can collaborate by investing in common funds. This particular game is defined by the following function, and with this data we can compute the Shapley value and the nucleolus solutions. We calculate both solutions using the commands ShapleyValue() and Nucleolus(), respectively. We proceed in the following manner, Using DUAL simplex for phase 1 and DUAL simplex for phase 2. The primal and dual simplex pricing strategy set to 'Devex'.
Found feasibility by dual simplex after 4 iter. Next, by analyzing costs instead of gains, we introduce cost allocation problems, usually called airport problems (Littlechild and Thompson 1977) . Consider, for instance, several airlines that are jointly using an airstrip. Obviously, different airlines will have different needs for the airstrip. The larger the planes an airline flies, the longer the airstrip it needs. An airstrip that accommodates a given plane accommodates any smaller airplane at no extra cost. The airstrip is large enough to accommodate the largest plane any airline flies. How should its cost be divided among the airlines?
Note that under this illustration, several situations may be considered. For instance, consider farmers that are distributed along an irrigation drain. The farmer closest to the water gate only needs that the segment to his field would be maintained. Accordingly, the second closest farmer needs that the first two segments be maintained (the segment that goes from the water gate and the first farmer, and that segment from the first farmer to his field), and so on. The cost of maintaining a segment used by several farmers is incurred only once, independently of how many farmers use it. How should the total cost of maintaining the ditch be shared?
In order to illustrate this, consider the following cost airport game. First we compute the Shapley value, > COALITIONS <-c (26, 27, 55, 57, 53, 81, 83, 82, 84, 110, 108, 110, 110, 110, 110 1  26  2  27  3  55  4  57  12  53  13  81  14  83 23  82  24  84  34  110  123  108  124  110  134  110  234  110  1234 110 > NAMES <-c("Airline 1","Airline 2","Airline 3","Airline 4") > AIRSHAPLEY<-ShapleyValue(AIR,NAMES) > summary(AIRSHAPLEY) Table 3) To perform the Shapley -Shubik power index one simply provides the number of members of each party and the minimum amount of votes needed to pass a vote. The R session to obtain magnitudes of Table 3 is 
A note on the nucleolus computation
Validating the nucleolus solution might be an issue. Indeed, there is a fruitful discussion in the literature on what strategy is optimal to obtain the nucleolus, how it should be calculated, or what algorithm could achieve a better solution. For instance, Guajardo and Jörnsten (2015) discuss several nucleolus solutions among different papers, finding that the published results might not be optimal. Therefore, for the sake of robustness, we check our nucleolus commands through the correspondence between conflicting claims problems and bankruptcy games.
Following O'Neill (1982) , a bankruptcy game is the T U -game associated with a conflicting claims problem. Formally, for each (E, c) ∈ B, the cooperative game induced by (E, c) is the pair (N, v) , where the function v : 2 N → R + associates to each coalition S ⊆ N the real number v(S) = max 0, E − c i i∈N \ S .
According to O'Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) , for each conflicting claims problem, the Talmud and the random arrival rules coincide with the nucleolus and the Shapley value solutions of the associated bankruptcy game, respectively. A fact that we can replicate by computing the Talmud and the random arrival rules to the considered conflicting claims problem. For instance, the example of the airport cost game presented in Section 4.1, is associated to the following conflicting claims problem (E, c) = (110, (26, 27, 55, 57) ). Hence, we can transform this particular problem into a gains game by applying the aforementioned definition of O'Neill (1982) . (110,c(26,27,55,57) ).
